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Bell non-locality, the fact that local hidden variable models cannot reproduce the correlations
obtained by measurements on entangled states, is a cornerstone in our modern understanding of
quantum theory. Apart from its fundamental implications, non-locality is also at the core of device-
independent quantum information processing, which successful implementation is achieved without
precise knowledge of the physical apparatus. Here we show that a stronger form of Bell non-
locality, for which even non-local hidden variable models cannot reproduce the quantum predictions,
allows for the device-independent implementation of secret sharing, a paradigmatic communication
protocol where a secret split amidst many possibly untrusted parts can only be decoded if they
collaborate among themselves.
Among the many promises of quantum technologies,
quantum communication [1] is arguably at most ad-
vanced stage to break out of the lab and reach practical
large scale use, most prominently in quantum cryptog-
raphy [2] that, indeed, is already commercially avail-
able. Recent breakthroughs, such as the first loophole
free violation of Bell inequalities [3–5] and the launch
of a satellite capable of distributing quantum entangle-
ment across very large distances [6], made the goal of
scalable quantum networks [7] exchanging information
in a fundamentally secure way [8], even more tangible.
Central to quantum cryptography –for instance in the
famous BB84 protocol [9]– is the intrinsic randomness
of quantum mechanics, the fact that the outcomes of
measurements performed on quantum systems cannot
(in most cases) be predicted with certainty. Such proto-
cols, unfortunately, have to rely on a precise character-
ization and trust of measurements devices, otherwise
they can and in fact have already been hacked [10].
Hacking, however, becomes impossible in a broader
framework known as device-independent (DI) quan-
tum information processing [11–13]. At the center of
many DI applications is the phenomenon known as
Bell non-locality [14], the fact the correlations obtained
by local measurements on distant entangled states are
incompatible with any local hidden variable (LHV)
model. Independently of the precise knowledge about
the quantum states being prepared or which measure-
ments are being performed, the violation of a Bell in-
equality puts strict bounds on the amount of informa-
tion that any eavesdropper can have access to [15, 16],
providing the ultimate cryptographic security that can-
not be surpassed unless the very laws of physics are
broken.
In parallel to that, in recent years, LHV models have
been recognized as a particular and simple case of
causal Bayesian networks [17–19], giving rise to new
and stronger forms of non-classicality [20, 21] as com-
pared to the paradigmatic Bell non-locality. And, since
non-locality is a resource in a variety of DI applications
[22], it is natural to ask if these novel forms of non-
classical behavior can also be put to use in information
processing. As it turns out, the non-locality in quan-
tum networks composed by independent sources also
limits the information of an eavesdropper [23] and tem-
poral networks reminiscent of the instrumental causal
structure [24] provide a new and more efficient plat-
form for randomness certification [25]. In spite of all
progress, however, one paradigmatic quantum commu-
nication protocol has yet not found a DI formulation:
the secret sharing [26, 27]. In a secret sharing protocol,
a secret is split into n− 1 parts and sent to different re-
ceivers in a way that at least m ≤ n− 1 of them must
collaborate to reveal it. Even though, initial attempts
[28] indicated the possibility of a DI certification of se-
cret sharing, the fact that some of the receivers might
be untrusted introduces a new class of possible attacks
[29] that are not covered by the analysis based on the
standard Bell non-locality.
In this paper, we show that the DI certification of a
n-partite secret sharing protocol with up to n − 2 un-
trusted parties can be achieved via the violation of Bell
inequalities witnessing a stronger than Bell type of non-
locality. We employ the causal approach in [30] to show
that the attack by an untrusted receiver can be mapped
to relaxations of the locality assumption in Bell’s theo-
rem [20] and that can be characterized by the so-called
Svetlichny inequality [31]. By considering quantum as
well as non-signaling (NS) resources [32], we first ana-
lytically show that maximum violation of this inequal-
ity guarantees full security. Further, by writing the
corresponding optimization problem as a semi-definite
program we also show that the higher is the violation
of the Svetlichny inequality, the smaller is the informa-
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2tion that an untrusted receiver as well as an external
eavesdropper can get about the secret to be shared.
Secret sharing, causal models and the attack by an un-
trusted receiver– Without loss of generality, we will fo-
cus here in a tripartite secret sharing protocol between
three distant parties: Alice and Bob (the receivers) and
Charlie (the sender). Each of them have parts of a cor-
related device (see Fig. 1) which receives binary inputs
(x = 0, 1, y = 0, 1 and z = 0, 1 for Alice, Bob and Char-
lie respectively) and returns binary outputs (a = 0, 1,
b = 0, 1 and c = 0, 1, respectively). The device is thus
described by a probability distribution p(a, b, c|x, y, z).
Charlie’s aim is to share a secret bit c∗ with Alice and
Bob, in such a way that the their individual bits (a∗ and
b∗, respectively) are random and have no information
about c∗, for instance
c∗ = a∗ ⊕ b∗, (1)
where ⊕ represents sum mod(2) and a∗, b∗ and c∗
are the measurement outputs for some specific inputs
x = x∗, y = y∗, z = z∗. That is, Alice and Bob have to
collaborate in order to retrieve any information about
c∗. Furthermore, this should be achieved in a secure
way against a fourth malicious part (an eavesdropper)
and also assuming that either Alice or Bob might be un-
trusted (try to recover c∗ without the help of the other).
As proposed in [26, 27], it is possible to achieve secret
sharing against an eavesdropper if they share a quan-
tum state and each measure observables Ax, By and Cz
such that the
p(a, b, c|x, y, z) = Tr
[(
Max ⊗Mby ⊗Mcz
)
ρ
]
(2)
where Ax = M0x − M1x and Max is a POVM operator
(similarly for Bob and Charlie), A0 = B0 = C0 = σx
and A1 = B1 = C1 = σy (σx and σy being the Pauli
matrices) and ρ = |GHZ〉〈GHZ| is the GHZ state [33]
with |GHZ〉 = 1/√2 (|000〉+ |111〉). For instance, if
x∗ = y∗ = z∗ = 0 it follows that a∗ ⊕ b∗ = c∗, thus
fulfilling the condition for secret sharing. The DI secu-
rity against an eavesdropper can be seen from the fact
that the obtained distribution p(a, b, c|x, y, z) maximally
violates the Mermin inequality [34] and such violation
can only be achieved if the underlying quantum state
shared between Alice, Bob and Charlie is a pure GHZ
state [35–37], thus guaranteeing that any fourth party
(the eavesdropper) has no correlations whatsoever with
them (and thus no information about their measure-
ment outcomes and the secret).
But what if one of the receivers, Alice or Bob, are un-
trusted? To illustrate, suppose Alice is the untrusted
part (Fig. 1b). Her aim is to simulate a non-local corre-
lation satisfying the secret sharing condition a∗ ⊕ b∗ =
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
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FIG. 1. DAG representation of causal structures. a) Tripartite
scenario with an external eavesdropper that can share corre-
lations with Alice, Bob and Charlie but has no direct access to
their inputs or ouputs. b) If Alice is untrusted, she can corre-
late her input with the source Λ and try to guess the output
c via an extra outcome e (unknown to Bob and Charlie). c)
Causal structure where the input of Alice is broadcast to Bob
and Charlie and can generate the same NS correlations as the
DAG in Fig. 1b). d) DAG characterizing the correlations ob-
tainable by an untrusted Bob.
c∗ but, at the same time, generate an extra output e
conveying the most information about the secret bit c∗.
That is, she wants to maximize p(e = c|x∗y∗z∗), with-
out the need of collaboration with Bob. We can model
this scenario by a joint probability p(a, b, c, e|x, y, z) that
marginalizes to the observed distribution in the exe-
cution of the protocol, that is, ∑e p(a, b, c, e|x, y, z) =
p(a, b, c|x, y, z). As recently pointed out [29], if the
eavesdropper is among the receivers, a new class of at-
tack becomes possible. In order to model it we rep-
resent the underlying causal structure as a directed
acyclic graph (DAG) [17] as shown in Fig. 1. The ver-
tices denote the variables of interest (inputs, outputs
and source of correlations) and the direct edges encode
their causal relations. As paradigmatic in any DI cryp-
tographic protocol [12, 13], an external eavesdropper
has no direct access to the variables of the other par-
ties, the most it can do is to share correlations with
the others, for instance, having part of the joint quan-
tum state. This is captured by the DAG in Fig. 1a,
where the eavesdropper outcome e is only allowed to
have causal dependence on the source of correlations
λ. However, if the eavesdropper is one of the receivers,
it can now generate correlations between its own in-
put and the source of correlations (see Fig. 1b). In the
language of Bell’s theorem, this would be equivalent
3to a measurement dependent hidden variable model
[38–40]; in other terms, we cannot assume “free-will”,
as the measurement to be performed by the untrusted
part depends now on the common source of correla-
tions. Within this new causal structure, it is easy to
devise hidden variable models mimicking the violation
of Mermin’s inequality (see Appendix for further de-
tails). That is, Mermin’s violation is no longer enough
to guarantee the DI security of the protocol.
Stronger forms of non-locality and DI secret sharing– The
key insight behind our approach is that to be secure
against the generalized model in Fig. (1)b one first
should consider the Bell inequalities characterizing the
corresponding DAG. And, as we do not know which of
the two receivers, Alice or Bob, is the untrusted part,
this should also be taken into account. As detailed in
the Appendix, the main ingredient for the derivation of
Bell inequalities in this scenario is the fact that all cor-
relations that can be generated by the measurement de-
pendent model in Fig. 1b can also be generated by the
non-local HV model in Fig. 1c. Following this prescrip-
tion, we find that only one class of full-correlator Bell
inequalities characterize this scenario (also considering
the symmetry in Fig. 1d in which Bob is the untrusted
part), the well known Svetlichny inequality [31], that we
rewrite here as
S= pA(0|0)CHSH00 − pA(1|0)CHSH10 (3)
+pA(0|1)CHSH′01 − pA(1|1)CHSH′11 ≤ 4,
where pA(a|x) is the marginal probability of Alice;
CHSHax and CHSH′ax refer to symmetries of the CHSH
inequality [41] given by CHSHax = Eax00 + E
ax
01 + E
ax
10 −
Eax11 and CHSH
′
ax = Eax00 − Eax01 − Eax10 − Eax11 and Eaxyz =
∑b,c=0,1(−1)b+cp(b, c|x, a, y, z) is the expectation value
of the measurement outcome of Bob and Charlie con-
ditioned on a given outcome a and the input x of Al-
ice. Clearly, because of the normalization of pA(a|x), to
achieve the maximum quantum violation S = 4
√
2 (S =
8 for the NS set) necessarily we must have CHSH10 =
CHSH′11 = −2
√
2 and CHSH00 = CHSH′01 = 2
√
2 (or
CHSH10 = CHSH′11 = −4 and CHSH00 = CHSH′01 =
4 in the NS scenario). That is, independently of the
measurement outcome of Alice and her input (which
can affect both outcomes b and c, considering that she
is the untrusted party), the conditional statistics of Bob
and Charlie have to maximally violate the CHSH in-
equality. This is known to be possible if and only if
the state of Bob and Charlie (conditioned on a and x)
is the maximally entangled state of two qubits [11, 42]
for the quantum set, and a PR-box in the non-signaling
set. Thus, if a maximum quantum violation of the
Svetlichny inequality is observed, Bob and Charlie can
be sure that their conditioned state is uncorrelated with
any other system, that is, if we are restricted to quan-
tum correlations we have that ρBCE = ρBC ⊗ ρE. The
same line of reasoning follows if Bob is the untrusted
part. Hence, p(e = c|x∗y∗z∗) = 1/2, thus guarantee-
ing the full security in the secret sharing protocol. We
once more highlight that a self-testing result based on
the Mermin inequality is not enough in a scenario with
an untrusted part, as its violation could be simulated
by purely classical resources. On contrast, since the
Svetlichny violation witness a stronger form of non-
locality, even an untrusted part is not able to fake it.
The same argument can be employed to certify security
in a n-partite scenario, one sender and n− 1 receivers,
such that the secret is safe even against an attack of
n− 2 dishonest parts which may collaborate with each
other, see Appendix for details. The result above shows
that stronger forms of nonlocality can lead to new DI
protocols. However, as stated, it requires maximum
Svetlichny violation, that in practice cannot be achieved.
Nicely, as we show next, the result is robust, displaying
security even far from maximum violation.
The joint probability p(a, b, c, e|x, y, z) should respect
the causal constraints imposed by the causal model
underlying an untrusted receiver. For instance, if Al-
ice is untrusted (Fig. 1c), in generalized probabilistic
framework [32] this equals to impose the following con-
straints (plus the normalization and positivity condi-
tions):
∑b p(a, b, c, e|x, y, z) = ∑b p(a, b, c, e|x, y′, z),
∑c p(a, b, c, e|x, y, z) = ∑c p(a, b, c, e|x, y, z′) , (4)
referring to the non-signaling (NS) condition for Bob
and Charlie, respectively. It should also be noted that
the scenario of Fig. 1c allows for a marginal distribution
with signalling from Alice to Bob and Charlie. How-
ever, for her attack to be successful and not detectable
by the other parts, the observable tripartite distribution
p(abc|xyz) must also be non-signaling from Alice to the
other parties, that is
∑a,e p(abce|xyz) = ∑a,e p(abce|x′yz).
Alternatively, in a quantum description we have that
p(abce|xyz) = Tr
[(
Mex ⊗Max ⊗Mbx,y ⊗Mcx,z
)
ρABCE
]
,
(5)
and that in practice can be casted as an hierarchy
of approximations [43] implemented as semi-definite
programs. Similar expressions follow to the situation
where Bob is the untrusted part (Fig. 1d). We also
highlight, that as the DAGs in Fig. 1b-d have the usual
Bell DAG (Fig. 1a) as a particular case, all the results
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FIG. 2. Guessing probability as a function of Svetlichny’s
inequality violation. Upper bound for Eve’s guessing prob-
ability Pguess := p(e = c|x∗y∗z∗) for a generic quantum be-
haviour is shown as the solid curve. This bound is obtained
from the level 2+ABC+ABE+BCE+ABCE of the NPA hiearchy
[43]. Even with the approximation, it can be seen that for
the maximal quantum violation 4
√
2 of the inequality, per-
fect security for Charlie’s bit can be obtained as the guessing
probability approaches 0.5. The dashed curve represents the
optimal NS guessing probability.
derived for an untrusted part also clearly will hold for
an external eavesdropper.
The problem of security in the secret sharing protocol
is thus equivalent to an optimization problem: find the
maximum value for p(e = c|x∗y∗z∗) (where e stand for
the extra outcome of Alice or Bob, depending on who is
the untrusted part) given that a value of S is observed
and subject to the causal conditions of the model in Fig.
1c-d. As detailed in the Appendix and shown in Fig.
2, the amount of information the untrusted part can get
about the secret bit is a decreasing function of the viola-
tion of the Svetlichny inequality. Interestingly, however,
the guessing probability only starts to decrease after the
S parameter surpass some threshold value (S ≈ 4.82
for quantum and S = 6 for NS correlations). Notwith-
standing, below these threshold values, the security in
the secret sharing protocol can be achived by looking
at the full probability distribution instead of the single
parameter S. This is illustrate in Fig. 3 by considering
a GHZ state with a given visibility and measurements
maximally violating the Svetlichny inequality (3). Fur-
ther, as an example of a NS distribution fulfilling the
secret sharing condition we have
pv(a, b, c|x, y, z) = vpSvet + (1− v)pClas, (6)
with pSvet(a, b, c|x, y, z) = (1/4)δa⊕b⊕c,xy⊕xz⊕yz achiev-
ing the maximum Svetlichny violation S = 8,
pClas(a, b, c|x, y, z) = (1/4)δa⊕b⊕c,x being classically cor-
related and achieving S = 4. Thus S(v) = 4(1 + v)
and by solving the corresponding optimization prob-
lem one can show that max p(e = c|x∗y∗z∗) = 1− v/2,
that is, in this case the guessing probability is a linearly
decreasing function of the Svetlichny violation.
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FIG. 3. Guessing probability as a function of the quan-
tum state visibility. We consider the parties share a state
ρv = v|GHZ〉〈GHZ| + (1 − v)1 /8 and perform the opti-
mal measurements maximizing the violation of (3) given by
S(v) = 4
√
2v. The critical visibility value below which no
violation is possible is given by vcrit = 1/
√
2 and as we see,
above the critical value p(e = c|x∗y∗z∗) < 1. The straight blue
curve gives the guessing probability p(e = c|x∗y∗z∗) consid-
ering the level 2+ABC+ABE+BCE+ABCE in the semi-definite
approximation of the quantum set (5), the dot-dashed curve
in red shows the second level of approximation without these
extra terms and the dashed straight line considers the NS set
(4) (see the Appendix for more details).
Discussion– Quantum correlations allow for the ulti-
mate level of security in communication protocols, since
it is based on the own laws of physics and is achieved
without the need of a precise knowledge of the physi-
cal apparatus being used. At the center of the device-
independent approach for secure communication is the
violation of a Bell inequality, however, the use as a re-
source of non-local correlations beyond the standard
Bell definition is almost an uncharted territory. Here,
we show the practical relevance of stronger than Bell
non-local correlations, as they allow for the DI imple-
mentation of secret sharing, a communication primitive
where the parties have to collaborate in order to recover
a message. More precisely, attacks by an untrusted part
can be modelled by causal models relaxing the mea-
surement independence/locality assumption in Bell’s
theorem. Correlations incompatible with such nonlocal
hidden variable models put strict bounds on the infor-
mation achievable by the untrusted part and, in particu-
lar, the maximum violation of the Svetlichny inequality
guarantees full security in the protocol.
An interesting venue for future research is to under-
stand what other forms of non-classical behaviour can
also be turned into resource for DI quantum informa-
tion processing. As pointed out in [30], already at the
tripartite scenario there are eight nonequivalent classes
of non-local correlations, among which is the standard
Bell definition and the stronger form we consider here.
Can it be that for each class one can define a DI pro-
5tocol? We believe the answer to that question can lead
to even more exciting possibilities in quantum commu-
nication and we hope the present results may trigger
more research in this direction.
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Simulating Mermin’s inequality violation with an untrusted part
Consider the Mermin’s inequality [34] given by
M = E001 + E010 + E100 − E111 ≤ 2, (7)
and that is violated up to its algebraic maximum M = 4, for example, by the following non-signaling distribution:
p(a, b, c|x, y, z) = 1
4
δa⊕b⊕c,xy⊕xz. (8)
To simulate this correlation with the classical causal model where Alice is the untrusted part (Fig. 1b or equiva-
lently Fig. 1c) it is enough to consider a simple wiring using the local distribution given by
p(a, b, c|x, y, z) = (1/4)δa⊕b⊕c,y⊕z, (9)
where y and z are the inputs of Bob and Charlie. Since in the model in Fig. 1b, both Bob and Charlie have access
to the input x of Alice, they simply have to multiply their local inputs y and z by x and thus directly obtain the
distribution (8) maximally violation the Mermin inequality.
Derivation of Bell inequalities with an untrusted part
The causal structures we are working with are showed in the Fig. 1c and Fig. 1d. They represent one of the two
possible situations: i) Alice is the untrusted part; ii) Bob is the untrusted part. Since Charlie (the sender) does
7not know who is untrusted, our space of probabilities will be the convex combination of these two scenarios. Any
distribution compatible with these two causal structures have a decomposition given by:
p1(abce|xyz) =∑
λ
p(a|xλ)p(b|xyλ)p(c|xzλ)p(e|xλ)p(λ) (10)
p2(abce|xyz) =∑
λ
p(a|xyλ)p(b|yλ)p(c|yzλ)p(e|yλ)p(λ). (11)
As we see, each of these decompositions define a convex set, more precisely a polytope, the extremal points of
which are deterministic strategies mapping inputs to outputs. For instance, p(a|xyλ) = δa, f (x,y,λ) where f (x, y,λ)
is a boolean function (that can change depending on the value of λ) mapping the inputs x, y to a output value.
We thus can construct the V-representation of the polytope (matrix of vertices corresponding to these deterministic
strategies) and use a solver to find the H-representation (Bell inqualities) for this scenario. Notice that the Bell
inequalities will only involve p(abc|xyz), that is, we marginalize over e.
The complexity (dimensionality and number of extremal points) of this scenario is already high enough such that
we cannot completely characterize the polytope in terms of the joint distributions. For this reason, we compute the
extremal points (deterministic probabilities) in terms of the full correlators (Exyz) for each causal structure and join
them in one single matrix. This matrix is the V-representation of the our combined polytope. We then employ the
python package called "cdd" [44] to obtain H- representation, i.e., the facets of the polytope. We found 48 facets,
the non-trivial of which are symmetries of the well known Svetlichny inequality (see Eq. 3).
Obtaining the optimal guessing probability in generalized probabilistic theories with linear programming
Here we present how to write the maximization of the guessing probibility for the NS set as a "Linear Program-
ming" (LP) formulation. Our aim is to maximize the guessing probability p(e = c|x∗y∗z∗) given a certain observed
distribution p(a, b, c|x, y, z) or that a certain violation of the Svetlichny inequality is observed. The code below refers
to the causal structure showed in the Fig. 1c such that Alice is the untrusted part (with similar structure and same
results for the case where Bob is the untrusted part). The maximization problem can then be written as:
max
p∈Rn
〈~f , p〉 (12)
s.t. ∑
e,a
p(abce|xyz)−∑
e,a
p(abce|x′yz) = 0 (∀ b, c, x, x′, y, z)
∑
b
p(abce|xyz)−∑
b
p(abce|xy′z) = 0 (∀ a, c, x, y, y′, z)
∑
c
p(abce|xyz)−∑
c
p(abce|xyz′) = 0 (∀ a, b, x, y, z, z′)
∑
a,b,c,e
δa⊕b⊕c,0p(abce|x∗y∗z∗) = 1
∑
a,b,c,e
p(abce|xyz) = 1 ∀ x, y, z
S · p = γ
p ≥ 0n,
where the first three equations refers to the non-signaling conditions (for Alice, Bob and Charlie), followed by the
secret sharing constraint for an specific input choice (x = x∗, y = y∗, z = z∗), normalization, the violation of the
Svetlichny inequality and positivity. ~f represents the objective function such that ~f · p ≡ p(e = c|x∗y∗z∗).
Obtaining upper bounds for the optimal guessing probability in quantum theory with semi-definite programming
Here we tackle the problem of finding the maximal guessing probability in the scenario where Alice is the
malicious party, when only a quantum channel is provided as nonlocal resource. This corresponds to finding a
8distribution compatible with the structure shown in Eq. (5), which in turn is compatible with the causal structure of
Fig. 1c, when the hidden variable Λ is made quantum. Performing this optimization over all quantum behaviours
is, however, a difficult problem in general [22]. To circumvent this problem, we look for upper bounds for this
optimal guessing probability, retrieved by relaxations of the problem that can be solved in a easier way.
We consider the Navascues-Pironio-Acin (NPA) hierarchy to perform this approximation [43]. It consists in
a family of converging supersets for the set of quantum distributions, in where each level of the hierarchy is
describable by a set of linear matrix inequalities in the variables of the problem. For each level of the hierarchy, the
problem is then simplified to a semi-definite program (SDP) [43, 45], for which there are efficient algorithms for its
solution.
Here we considered the second level of the hierarchy with extra terms combining three and four projections of
distinct parties. More precisely, we considered the level 2 + ABC + ABE + BCE + ABCE of the hierarchy, where
E indicates projections on Eve’s state. Besides looking for a moment matrix C compatible with the observable
distribution, we also enforce similar constraints to the ones in (12), pertinent to the model of Fig. 1c due to
the non-signaling principle, and to the fine-tuned non-signaling structure manifest by the marginal distribution
pABC(abc|xyz) := ∑e p(abce|xyz). If we also impose that this marginal distribution equates to some fixed quantum
distribution PQ(abc|xyz), then the problem becomes the SDP specified below:
max
p,C
p(e = c|x∗y∗z∗) (13a)
s.t. ∑
a,b,c,e
p(abce|xyz) = 1 ∀ x, y, z (13b)
p(abce|xyz) ≥ 0 ∀ a, b, c, e, x, y, z (13c)
∑
b
p(abce|xyz)−∑
b
p(abce|xy′z) = 0 ∀a, c, e, x, y, z, y′ (13d)
∑
c
p(abce|xyz)−∑
c
p(abce|xyz′) = 0 ∀a, b, e, x, y, z, z′ (13e)
∑
e,a
p(abce|xyz)−∑
e,a
p(abce|x′yz) = 0 ∀b, c, y, z (13f)
pABC(abc|xyz) = PQ(abc|xyz) ∀a, b, c, x, y, z (13g)
C = C†, C ≥ 0 (13h)
∑
jk
ΓijkCjk = `i(p), (13i)
where the constraint (13i) represents sets of linear restrictions in the entries of C that make it compatible with a
truncated moment matrix with elements Cij = Tr
[
Mi M†j ρ
]
, where Mi are projections or sequence of projections
on the parties involved. Γijk and `i are the specific coefficients and linear functions that make the correspondence
between the expected value for the entry and the known data.
A solution to SDP (13) when PQ is given by
PQ = Tr
[(
Max ⊗Mby ⊗Mcz
)
ρv
]
, (14)
with ρV = v|GHZ〉〈GHZ| + (1− v)1 /8, Alice measuring observables {−(σx + σy)/
√
2, (σx − σy)/
√
2}, and Bob
and Charlie measuring {σx, σy}, is shown as the solid curve in Fig. 3 for visibilities 0 ≤ v ≤ 1 of the main text.
Generic quantum bounds for the guessing probability in Eq.(13a) were obtained by replacing constraint (13g)
for a specific violation of Svetlichny’s inequality (3) with results shown in Fig. 2 of the main text. Notice that for
the quantum correlation maximally violating the Svetlichny inequality, the secret sharing condition is not satisfied.
However, just as it happens in quantum key distribution protocols based on usual Bell inequality violation [8],
it is just enough that one of the parties perform a third measurement (for which the secret sharing condition
a⊕ b = c is satisfied). Furthermore, this condition can also be directly imposed in the optimization problem. For
instance, in Fig. 4 we consider this same problem for specific violations of the inequality, but also ensure the secret
sharing condition (without adding a third measurement input as discussed above) a⊕ b⊕ c = 0 when inputs are
x∗ = y∗ = z∗ = 0 .
In all cases, to solve the SDP we used mosek as solver [46] and Peter Wittek’s library ncpol2sdpa [47] to model the
problem and obtain the hierarchy. Codes are made available in ref [48].
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FIG. 4. Guessing probability with secret sharing condition imposed. Upper bound for Eve’s guessing probability for a generic
quantum behaviour as function of the violation of inequality (3) with the additional constraint that a⊕ b⊕ c = 0. It should be
noted that, in contrast to the case with no secret sharing (Fig. 2 of the main text), now the optimization becomes infeasible for
S ≈ 5.29, before the quantum bound 4√2. Nonetheless, it is still possible to certify some randomness on Charlie’s bit as the
guessing probability approaches 52% for the values of violation shown here.
Example of an “unsafe" NS distribution
As discussed in the main text, below the threshold of S = 6, the violation of the Svetlichny inequality is not
enough to guarantee the security of the secret sharing protocol.
For instance, consider the distribution
p(abce|xyz) = 1
4
δa⊕b⊕c,xy⊕xz⊕xyzδe⊕c⊕x(a⊕b),xy⊕xz⊕xyz, (15)
where δu,v is the Kronecker’s delta, defined by δu,v = 1 if u = v, and δu,v = 0 otherwise, and where ⊕ denotes
addition modulo 2. It is straightforward to show that this distribution not only satisfies the required non-signaling
constraints (13d)-(13f), but also violates Svetlichny’s inequality by a value of 6, guaranteeing the secret sharing con-
dition a⊕ b⊕ c = 0, while at the same time providing no security to Charlie’s bit, by exhibiting maximal guessing
probability for Eve. Indeed, for x∗ = y∗ = z∗ = 0, the distribution reduces to p(abce|x∗y∗z∗) = δa⊕b⊕c,0δe⊕c,0/4,
which is non-zero only when both conditions a⊕ b⊕ c = 0 and e⊕ c = 0 are satisfied simultaneously. While the
first condition amounts to the secret sharing condition, the second one ensures that ∑e p(e = c|x∗y∗z∗) = 1. To see
that Svetlichny’s inequality is violated, consider its expression as
S = ∑
abcxyz
βabcxyz P(abc|xyz) ≤ 4, (16)
where βabcxyz := (−1)a+b+c+xy+xz+yz. For the distribution (15), we obtain P(abc|xyz) = δa⊕b⊕c,xy⊕xz⊕xyz/4 = (1+
(−1)a+b+c+xy+xz+xyz)/8 as marginal distribution for Alice, Bob and Charlie. The left-hand side (lhs) of inequality
(16) then reduces to ∑xyz(−1)(x+1)yz = 6, which then proves that the distribution provided is not only non-local,
but also post-quantum, and yet this doesn’t prevent Eve’s guessing probability from reaching 1.
If we drop the restriction to the secret sharing condition a⊕ b⊕ c = 0, we may consider the distribution
p(u)(abce|xyz) =

1
16 (1+ βabc1yz) x = 1,
1
8δe,c x = 0, z = 0,
1
16 (1+ βabc0y1u) x = 0, z = 1,
(17)
given in terms of the parameter u ∈ [−1, 1], which also satisfies the non-signaling constraints (13d)-(13f) and also
provides a guessing probability p(e = c|x∗y∗z∗) = 1, but that now has a tunable violation for expression (16). In
fact, with p(u) we obtain S = 4+ 2u, and therefore 2 ≤ S ≤ 6.
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Analytical proof of secret for the n participants scenario
Now consider the case in which there are n participants, one sender (which we will set as a1) and n− 1 receivers.
Each part A(j) with two inputs xj = 0, 1 and two outputs aj = 0, 1, for j = 1, 2, ..., n.
The n-partite Svetlichny inequality Sn presents a recursive relation given by
Sn = Sn−1A
(n)
0 + S
′
n−1A
(n)
1 ≤ 4, (18)
in which S′n−1 is obtained by performing the relabel x1 → x1 ⊕ 1 on Sn−1 [22].
Similarly to what has been done in the main text, we can re-express the n-partite Svetlichny inequality as
Sn = pAn(0|0)S00n−1 − pAn(1|0)S10n−1 + pAn(0|1)S′01n−1 − pAn(1|1)S′1|1n−1. (19)
In the above equation, pAn(an|xn) stands for the marginal distribution of part An; Saxn−1 and S′axn−1 stands for the
(n− 1)-partite Svetlichny inequality for the remaining parts (conditioned on the input and output of part An).
We can now apply the same argument for Saxn−1 and S
′ax
n−1:
Sn = pAn(0|0)S00n−1 − pAn(1|0)S10n−1 + pAn(0|1)S′01n−1 − pAn(1|1)S′11n−1
= pAn(0|0)(A00n−1S00n−2 + A00n−1S′00n−2)− pAn(1|0)(A10n−1S10n−2 + A10n−1S′10n−2)
+ pAn(0|1)(A01n−1S′01n−2 + A01n−1S01n−2)− pAn(1|1)(A11n−1S′11n−2 + A11n−1S11n−2)
= ∑
an ,an−1,xn ,xn−1=0,1
(−1)an+an−1 pAn(an|xn)pAn−1(an−1|xn−1anxn)S(xn⊕xn−1)an−1anxn−1xnn−2
= ∑
an ,an−1,xn ,xn−1=0,1
(−1)an+an−1 pAn ,An−1(an−1an|xn−1xn)S(xn⊕xn−1)an−1anxn−1xnn−2 , (20)
where we adopt the notation S(0)an−1anxn−1xnn−2 = S
an−1anxn−1xn
n−2 , and S
(1)an−1anxn−1xn
n−2 = S
′an−1anxn−1xn
n−2
By repeating this process n− 4 times, we obtain:
Sn = ∑
a3,...,an=0,1
(−1)∑nj=3 aj pA3...An(a3...an|x3...xn)CHSH(
⊕n
k=3 xk)a3...anx3...xn (21)
where CHSH(1)a3..anx3...xn = CHSHa3..anx3...xn , and CHSH(1)a3..anx3...xn = CHSH′a3..anx3...xn .
Hence, in order to obtain the maximal violation for Sn, we must have CHSH(
⊕n
k=3 xk)a3...anx3...xn = (−1)∑nj=3 aj2√2
for the quantum set and CHSH(
⊕n
k=3 xk)a3...anx3...xn = (−1)∑nj=3 aj4 in the non-signaling set. This implies that despite
of the inputs and outputs of the n − 2 untrusted parts, when maximally violating the Svetlichny’s inequality
the correlation between the sender and the single trusted receiver is secure, thus certifying the secret sharing
protocol against the attack of the n − 2 untrusted parts. Given the symmetry of the Svetlichny correlation, the
same result follows for any combination of attackers. The observation of the maximal violation of the n-partite
Svetlichny inequality certifies, in a device-independent manner, the security of the n-partite secret sharing protocol
guaranteeing that all n− 1 receivers must collaborate in order to recover the secret.
